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Abstract
Deep neural networks are being increasingly used in real world applications (e.g.
surveillance, face recognition). This has resulted in concerns about the fairness of
decisions made by these models. Various notions and measures of fairness have
been proposed to ensure that a decision-making system does not disproportionately
harm (or benefit) particular subgroups of population. In this paper, we argue
that traditional notions of fairness that are only based on models’ outputs are not
sufficient when decision-making systems such as deep networks are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks. We argue that in some cases, it may be easier for an attacker to
target a particular subgroup, resulting in a form of robustness bias. We propose
a new notion of adversarial fairness that requires all subgroups to be equally
robust to adversarial perturbations. We show that state-of-the-art neural networks
can exhibit robustness bias on real world datasets such as CIFAR10, CIFAR100,
Adience, and UTKFace. We then formulate a measure of our proposed fairness
notion and use it as a regularization term to decrease the robustness bias in the
traditional empirical risk minimization objective. Through empirical evidence, we
show that training with our proposed regularization term can partially mitigate
adversarial unfairness while maintaining reasonable classification accuracy.
1 Introduction
Automated decision-making systems that are driven by data are being used in a variety of different
real-world applications. In many cases, these systems make decisions on data points that represent
humans (e.g., targeted ads [39], personalized recommendations [3, 37], hiring [34, 35], credit
scoring [24], or recidivism prediction [8]). In such scenarios, there is often concern regarding the
fairness of outcomes of the systems [2]. This has resulted in a growing body of work from the nascent
Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, and Ethics (FATE) community that—drawing on prior legal
and philosophical doctrine—aims to define, measure, and (attempt to) mitigate manifestations of
unfairness in automated systems [4, 8, 13, 27].
Most of the initial work on fairness in machine learning considered notions that were one-shot and
considered the model and data distribution to be static [2, 8, 11, 43–45]. Recently, there has been
more work exploring notions of fairness that are dynamic and consider the possibility that the world
(i.e., the model as well as data points) might change over time [18, 20, 21, 28]. Our proposed notion
of robustness bias has subtle difference from existing one-shot and dynamic notions of fairness in that
it requires each partition of the population be equally robust to imperceptible changes in the input
(e.g., noise, adversarial perturbations, etc).
We propose a simple and intuitive notion of robustness bias which requires subgroups of populations
to be equally “robust.” Robustness can be defined in multiple different ways [14, 30, 41]. We take
a general definition which assigns points that are farther away from the decision boundary higher
robustness. Our key contributions are as follows:
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• We define a simple, intuitive notion of robustness bias that requires all partitions of the
dataset to be equally robust. We argue that such a notion is especially important when the
decision-making system is a deep neural network (DNN) since these have been shown to
be susceptible to various attacks [7, 29]. Importantly, our notion depends not only on the
outcomes of the system, but also on the distribution of distances of data-points from the
decision boundary, which in turn is a characteristic of both the data distribution and the
learning process.
• We propose different methods to measure this form of bias. Measuring the exact distance
of a point from the decision boundary is a challenging task for deep neural networks which
have a highly non-convex decision boundary. This makes the measurement of robustness
bias a non-trivial task. In this paper we use existing ways of approximating the distance of
each point (e.g., adversarial attacks).
• We do an in-depth analysis of a special case of robustness bias which requires all partitions
(or subgroups) of the dataset (often described by some sensitive feature like race, gender etc.)
to be equally robust to adversarial perturbations. Through extensive empirical evaluation
we show that adversarial unfairness can exist for many state-of-the art models that are trained
on common classification datasets. We raise several questions regarding the fairness of such
models when it is be easier to attack a certain population through adversarial perturbations.
• Finally, we propose a novel regularization term which captures our proposed notion. We
show that this can be used as a regularizer to reduce robustness bias.
1.1 Related Work
Fairness in ML. Models that learn from historic data have been shown to exhibit unfairness, i.e., they
disproportionately benefit or harm certain subgroups (often a sub-population that shares a common
sensitive attribute such as race, gender etc.) of the population [2, 8, 24]. This has resulted in a lot
of work on quantifying, measuring and to some extent also mitigating unfairness [1, 10, 11, 15, 17,
32, 42–45]. Most of these works consider notions of fairness that are one-shot—that is, they do not
consider how these systems would behave over time as the world (i.e., the model and data distribution)
evolves. Recently more works have taken into account the dynamic nature of these decision-making
systems and consider fairness definitions and learning algorithms that fare well across multiple time
steps [18, 20, 21, 28]. We take inspiration from both the one-shot and dynamic notions, but take a
slightly different approach by requiring all subgroups of the population to be equally robust to minute
changes in their features. These changes could either be random or carefully crafted adversarial
noise. This is closely related to Heidari et al. [21]’s effort-based notion of fairness; however, their
notion has a very specific use case of societal scale models whereas our approach is more general and
applicable to all kinds of models. Our work is also closely related to and inspired by Zafar et al.’s use
of a regularized loss function which captures fairness notions and reduces disparity in outcomes [44].
Adversarial Attacks. Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been shown to be susceptible to carefully
crafted adversarial perturbations which—imperceptible to a human—result in a misclassification by
the model [14, 30, 41]. In the context of our paper, we use adversarial attacks to approximate the
distance of a data point to the decision boundary. For this we use state-of-the-art white-box attacks
proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [29] and Carlini and Wagner [7]. Due to the many works on
adversarial attacks, there have been many recent works on provable robustness to such attacks. The
high-level goal of these works is to estimate a (tight) lower bound on the distance of a point from the
decision boundary [9, 33, 38]. We leverage these methods to estimate distances from the decision
boundary which helps assess robustness bias (defined formally in Section 3).
2 Heterogeneous Susceptibility to Adversarial Attacks
In a classification setting, a learner is given some dataD = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 consisting of inputs xi ∈ Rd
and outputs yi ∈ C which are labels in some set of classes C = {c1, . . . , ck}. These classes form a
partition on the dataset such that D = ⊔c∈C{(xi, yi) | yi = cj}. The goal of learning in decision
boundary-based optimization is to draw delineations between points in feature space which sort
the data into groups according to their class label. The learning generally tries to maximize the
classification accuracy of the decision boundary choice. A learner chooses some loss function L to
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(a) Three-class classification problem for randomly
generated data.
(b) Proportion of a class which is greater than τ away
from a decision boundary.
Figure 1: An example of multinomial logistic regression.
minimize on a training dataset, parameterized by parameters θ, while maximizing the classification
accuracy on a test dataset.
Of course there are other aspects to classification problems that have recently become more salient in
the machine learning community. Considerations about the fairness of classification decisions, for
example, are one such way in which additional constraints are brought into a learner’s optimization
strategy. In these settings, the data D = {(xi, yi, si)}Ni=1 is imbued with some metadata which have
a sensitive attribute S = {s1, . . . , st} associated with each point. Like the classes above, these
sensitive attributes form a partition on the data such that D = ⊔s∈S{(xi, yi, si) | si = s}. Without
loss of generality, we assume a single sensitive attribute. Generally speaking, learning with fairness
in mind considers the output of a classifier based off of the partition of data by the sensitive attribute,
where some objective behavior, like minimizing disparate impact or treatment [44], is integrated into
the loss function or learning procedure to find the optimal parameters θ.
There is not a one-to-one correspondence between decision boundaries and classifier performance.
For any given performance level on a test dataset, there are infinitely many decision boundaries
which produce the same performance, see Figure 2. This raises the question: if we consider all
decision boundaries or model parameters which achieve a certain performance, how do we choose
among them? What are the properties of a desirable, high-performing decision boundary? As the
community has discovered, one undesirable characteristic of a decision boundary is its proximity to
data which might be susceptible to adversarial attack [14, 30, 41]. This provides intuition that we
should prefer boundaries that are as far away as possible from example data [5, 40].
Let us look at how this plays out in a simple example. In multinomial logistic regression, the decision
boundaries are well understood and can be written in closed form. This makes it easy for us to
compute how close each point is to a decision boundary. Consider for example a dataset and learned
classifier as in Figure 1a. For this dataset, we observe that the brown class, as a whole, is closer to a
decision boundary than the yellow or blue classes. We can quantify this by plotting the proportion of
data that are greater than a distance τ away from a decision boundary, and then varying τ . Let dθ(x)
be the minimal distance between a point x and a decision boundary corresponding to parameters θ.
For a given partition P of a dataset, D, such that D = ⊔P∈P P , we define the function:
ÎP (τ) =
|{(x, y) ∈ P | dθ(x) > τ, y = yˆ}|
|P |
If each element of the partition is uniquely defined by an element, say a class label, c, or a sensitive
attribute label, s, we equivalently will write Îc(τ) or Îs(τ) respectively. We plot this over a range of
τ in Figure 1b for the toy classification problem in Figure 1a. Observe that the function for the brown
class decreases significantly faster than the other two classes, quantifying how much closer the brown
class is to the decision boundary.
From a strictly classification accuracy point of view, the brown class being significantly closer to the
decision boundary is not of concern; all three classes achieve similar classification accuracy. However,
when we move away from this toy problem and into neural networks on real data, this difference
between the classes could become a potential vulnerability to exploit, particularly when we consider
adversarial examples.
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Figure 2: A toy example showing robustness bias. A.) the classifier (solid line) has 100% accuracy for blue and
green points. However for a budget τ (dotted lines), 70% of points belonging to the “round” subclass (showed
by dark blue and dark green) will get attacked while only 30% of points in the “cross” subclass will be attacked.
This shows a clear bias against the “round” subclass which is less robust in this case. B.) shows a different
classifier for the same data points also with 100% accuracy. However, in this case, with the same budget τ , 30%
of both “round” and “cross” subclass will be attacked, thus being less biased.
3 Robustness Bias
Our goal is to understand how susceptible different classes are to adversarial attacks. Ideally, no one
class would be more susceptible than any other, but this may not be possible. We have observed that
for the same dataset, there may be some classifiers which have differences between the distance of
that partition to a decision boundary; and some which do not. There may also be one partition P
which exhibits this discrepancy, and another partition P ′ which does not. Therefore, we make the
following statement about robustness bias:
Definition 1. A dataset D with a partition P and a classifier parameterized by θ exhibits robustness
bias if there exists an element of P for which the elements of that partition are either significantly
closer to (or significantly farther from) a decision boundary than elements not in P .
We might say that a dataset, partition, and classifier do not exhibit robustness bias if for all P, P ′ ∈ P
and all τ > 0
P(x,y)∈D{dθ(x) > τ | x ∈ P, y = yˆ} ≈ P(x,y)∈D{dθ(x) > τ | x ∈ P ′, y = yˆ}.
Intuitively, this definition requires that for a given perturbation budget τ and a given partition P , one
should not have any incentive to perturb data points from P over points that do not belong to P . Even
when examining this criteria, we can see that this might be particularly hard to satisfy. Thus, we want
to quantify the disparate susceptibility of each element of a partition to adversarial attack, i.e., how
much farther or closer it is to a decision boundary when compared to all other points. We can do this
with the following function for a dataset D with partition element P ∈ P and classifier parameterized
by θ:
RB(P, τ) = |Px∈D{dθ(x) > τ | x ∈ P, y = yˆ} − Px∈D{dθ(x) > τ | x /∈ P, y = yˆ} |
Observe that RB(P, τ) is a large value if and only if the elements of P are much more (or less)
adversarially robust than elements not in P . We can then quantify this for each element P ∈ P—but
a more pernicious variable to handle is τ . We propose to look at the area under the curve ÎP for all τ :
σ(P ) =
AUC(ÎP )−AUC(
∑
P ′ 6=P ÎP ′)
AUC(
∑
P ′ 6=P ÎP ′)
Note that these notions take into account the distances of data points from the decision boundary
and hence are orthogonal and complementary to other traditional notions of bias or fairness (e.g.,
disparate impact/disparate mistreatment [44], etc). This means that having lower robustness bias does
not necessarily come at the cost of fairness as measured by these notions. Consider the motivating
example shown in Figure 2: the decision boundary on the right has lower robustness bias but preserves
all other common notions (e.g. [11, 17, 43]) as both classifiers maintain 100% accuracy.
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Figure 3: For each dataset, we plot Îc(τ) for each class c in each dataset. Each blue line represents one class.
The red line represents the mean of the blue lines, i.e.,
∑
c∈C Îc(τ) for each τ .
3.1 Using Upper Bounds to Estimate dθ(x), the Distance to the Decision Boundary
The above requires a way to measure the distance between a point and the closest decision boundary.
For most classifiers in use today, a direct computation of dθ(x) is not feasible. However, there are
efficient ways to approximate dθ(x) for a given neural network. One such way is to use an adversarial
example, yielding an upper bound on the distance; another is to use techniques from the robustness
certificates literature [9, 33, 38] to yield a lower bound on the distance. From a fairness standpoint,
upper bounds are more appropriate since perturbing an input by τ where τ is the upper bound for that
input will provably result in a different classification.
For a given input and model, one can compute an adversarial example by performing an optimization
which alters the input image slightly so as to place the altered image into a different category than
the original. Assume for a given datapoint x, we are able to compute an adversarial image x˜, then
the distance between these two images provides an upper bound on minimal distance to a decision
boundary, i.e, ‖x− x˜‖ ≥ dθ(x).
We evaluate two adversarial attacks: DeepFool [29] and CarliniWagner’s L2 attack [7]. We extend ÎP
for DeepFool as ÎDFP =
|{(x,y)∈P |τ<‖x−x˜‖,y=yˆ}|
|P | . We use similar notation to define σ
DF (P ), ÎCWP ,
and σCW (P ). While these methods are guaranteed to yield upper bounds on dθ(x), they need not
yield similar behavior to ÎP or σ(P ). We perform an evaluation of this in Section 4.3.
4 Experimental Evidence Robustness Bias Exists in the Wild
We hypothesize that there exist datasets and model architectures which exhibit adversarial robustness
bias. To investigate this claim, we examine several image-based classification datasets and common
model architectures.
4.1 Datasets and Model Architectures
We perform these tests of the datasets CIFAR-10 [25], CIFAR-100 [25] (using both 100 classes and
20 super classes), Adience [12], and UTKFace [46]. The first two are widely accepted benchmarks
in image classification, while the latter two provide significant metadata about each image, permitting
various partitions of the data by final classes and sensitive attributes.
Our experiments were performed using PyTorch’s torchvision module [31]. We first explore a simple
Multinomial Logistic Regression model which could be fully analyzed with direct computation
of the distance to the nearest decision boundary. For convolutional neural networks, we focus on
Alexnet [26], VGG [36], ResNet [19], DenseNet [22], and Squeezenet [23] which are all available
through torchvision. We use these models since these are widely used for a variety of tasks. We
achieve performance that is comparable to state of the art performance on these datasets for these
models 1.
4.2 Exact Computation in a Simple Model: Multinomial Logistic Regression
We begin our analysis by studying the behavior of multinomial logistic regression. Admittedly, this
is a simple model compared to modern deep-learning-based approaches; however, it enables is to
1See Appendix A Table 1 for model performances, additional quantitative results and supporting figures.
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Figure 4: For each dataset, we plot Îτs for each sensitive attribute s in each dataset. Additional figures for other
models can be found in Appendix A.
explicitly compute the exact distance to a decision boundary, dθ(x). We fit a regression to each of our
vision datasets to their native classes and plot Îc(τ) for each dataset. Figure 3 shows the distributions
of Îc(τ), from which we observe three main phenomena: (1) the general shape of the curves are
similar for each dataset, (2) there are classes which are significant outliers from the other classes,
and (3) the range of support of the τ for each dataset varies significantly. We discuss each of these
individually.
First, we note that the shape of the curves for each dataset is qualitatively similar. Since the form of
the decision boundaries in multinomial logistic regression are linear delineations in the input space, it
is fair to assume that this similarity in shape in Figure 3 can be attributed to the nature of the classifier.
Second, there are classes c which indicate disparate treatment under Îc(τ). The treatment disparities
are most notable in UTKFace, the superclass version CIFAR100, and regular CIFAR100. This
suggests that, when considering the dataset as a whole, these outlier classes are less suceptible to
adversarial attack than other classes. Further, in UTKFace, there are some classes that are considerably
more susceptible to adversarial attack because a larger proportion of that class is closer to the decision
boundaries.
We also observe that the median distance to decision boundary can vary based on the dataset. The
median distance to a decision boundary for each dataset is: 0.40 for CIFAR10; 0.10 for CIFAR100;
0.06 for the superclass version of CIFAR100; 0.38 for Adience; and 0.12 for UTKFace. This is no
surprise as dθ(x) depends both on the location of the data points (which are fixed and immovable in a
learning environment) and the choice of architectures/parameters.
Finally, we consider another partition of the datasets. Above, we consider the partition of the dataset
which occurs by the class labels. With the Adience and UTKFace datasets, we have an additional
partition by sensitive attributes. Adience admits partitions based off of gender; UTKFace admits
partition by gender and ethnicity. We note that Adience and UTKFace use categorical labels for
these multidimensional and socially complex concepts. We know this to be reductive and serves to
minimize the contextualization within which race and gender derive their meaning [6, 16]. Further, we
acknowledge the systems and notions that were used to reify such data partitions and the subsequent
implications and conclusions draw therefrom. We use these socially and systemically-laden partitions
to demonstrate that the functions we define, ÎP and σ depend upon how the data are divided for
analysis. To that end, the function ÎP is visualized in Figure 4. We observe that the Adience dataset,
which exhibited some adversarial robustness bias in the partition on C only exhibits minor adversarial
robustness bias in the partition on S for the attribute ‘Female’. On the other hand, UTKFace which
had signifiant adversarial robustness bias does exhibit the phenomenon for the sensitive attribute
‘Black’ but not for the sensitive attribute ‘Female’.
This emphasizes that adversarial robustness bias is dependant upon the dataset and the partition. We
will demonstrate later that it is also dependant on the choice of classifier. First, we talk about ways to
approximate dθ(x) for more complicated models.
4.3 Evaluation of ÎDFP and ÎCWP
To compare the estimate of dθ(x) by DeepFool and CarliniWagner, we first look at the signedness
of σ(P ), σDF (P ), and σCW (P ). Considering all 151 possible partitions for all five datasets,
both CarliniWagner and DeepFool agree with the signedness of the direct computation 125 times,
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Figure 5: Depiction of σDFP and σCWP for the UTKFace dataset with partitions corresponding to the (1) class
labels C and the, (2) gender, and (3) race/ethnicity. These values are reported for all five convolutional models
both at the beginning of their training (after one epoch) and at the end. We observe that, largely, the signedness
of the functions are consistent between the five models and also across the training cycle.
i.e., 1P
[
sign(σ(P )) = sign(σDF (P ))
]
= 125 = 1P
[
sign(σ(P )) = sign(σCW (P ))
]
. Further,
the mean difference between σ(P ) and σCW (P ) or σDF (P ), i.e., (σ(P ) − σDF (P )), is 0.17 for
DeepFool and 0.19 for CarliniWagner with variances of 0.07 and 0.06 respectively.
There is 83% agreement between the direct computation and the DeepFool and CarliniWagner
estimates of ÎP . This behavior provides evidence that adversarial attacks provide meaningful upper
bounds on dθ(x) in terms of the behavior of identifying instances of adversarial robustness bias.
4.4 Approximate Computation in Deep Models: CNNs
We now evaluate five commonly-used convolutional networks: Alexnet, VGG, ResNet, DenseNet,
and Squeezenet. We trained these networks using PyTorch with standard stochastic gradient descent.
We achieve comparable performance to documented state of the art for these models on these datasets.
A full table of performance on the test data are described in Table 1. After training each model on
each dataset, we generated adversarial examples using both methods and computed σP for each
possible partition of the dataset. An example of the results for the UTKFace dataset can be see in
Figure 5.2.
With evidence from section 4.3 that DeepFool and CarliniWagner can approximate the robustness bias
behavior of direct computations of dθ, we first ask if there are any major differences between the two
methods. If DeepFool exhibits adversarial robustness bias for a dataset and a model and a class, does
CarliniWagner exhibit the same? and vice versa? Since there are 5 different convolutional models,
we have 151 · 5 = 755 different comparisons to make. Again, we first look at the signedness of
σDF (P ) and σCW (P ) and we see that 1P
[
sign(σDF (P )) = sign(σCW (P ))
]
= 708. This means
there is 94% agreement between DeepFool and CarliniWagner about the direction of the adversarial
robustness bias.
To investigate if this behavior is exhibited earlier in the training cycle than at the final, fully-trained
model, we compute σCW (P ) and σDF (P ) for the various models and datasets for trained models
after 1 epoch and the middle epoch. For the first epoch, 637 of the 755 partitions were internally
consistent, i.e., the signedness of σ was the same in the first and last epoch, and 621 were internally
consistent. We see that at the middle epoch, 671 of the 755 partitions were internally consistent for
DeepFool and 665 were internally consistent for CarliniWagner. Unsurprisingly, this implies that
as the training progresses, so does the behavior of the adversarial robustness bias. However, it is
surprising that much more than 80% of the final behavior is determined after the first epoch, and
there is a slight increase in agreement by the middle epoch.
We note that, of course, adversarial robustness bias is not necessarily an intrinsic value of a dataset;
it may be exhibited by some models and not by others. However, in our studies, we see that the
UTKFace dataset partition on Race/Ethnicity does appear to be significantly prone to adversarial
attacks given its comparatively low σDF (P ) and σCW (P ) values across all models.
5 Partially Combatting Robustness Bias through Regularization
Motivated by evidence (see Section 4) that robustness bias exists in a diverse set of real-world
models and datasets, we will now show that the expression of robustness bias can be included in an
2Our full slate of approximation results are available in Appendix A
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optimization. We do so in a natural way: by formulating a regularization term that captures robustness
bias.
Recall the traditional Empirical Risk Minimization objective, ERM := lcls(fθ(X), Y ) where lcls is
cross entropy loss. Now we wish to model our measure of fairness (see Section 3) and minimize for
it alongside ERM. We first write the empiric estimate of RB(P, τ) as R˜B(P, τ); a full derivation
can be found in Appendix B.1. Formally,
R˜B(P, τ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1∑
x/∈P
1{y = yˆ}
∑
x/∈P
y=yˆ
1{dθ(x) > τ} − 1∑
x∈P
1{y = yˆ}
∑
x∈P
y=yˆ
1{dθ(x) > τ}
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
To use this as a regularizer during training, we must compute the closed form expression of dθ. For
this, we take inspiration from the way adversarial inputs are created using DeepFool [29]. Just like
in DeepFool, we also approximate distance from fθ considering fθ to be linear (even though it may
be a highly non-linear DNN). There, we incorporate into R˜B(P, τ) the approximation dθ(x) =
| fθ(x)||∇xfθ(x)|| | . Finally, we minimize for the new objective function, ADVERM := lcls(fθ(X), Y ) +
αRB(P, τ).
5.1 Experimental Results using Regularized Models
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(b) α = 0.1, τ = 5.0.
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(d) α = 1.0, τ = 5.0.
Figure 6: In the unregularized model, “truck” in CIFAR10 tends to be more robust than other classes (6a);
however, using ADVERM reduces that disparity (6b). We see similar behavior for UTKFace (6c & 6d).
Using our regularized objective, ADVERM, we re-train the model (details in Appendix B) considering
α and τ as hyperparameters, in addition to the traditional hyperparameters such as learning rate,
momentum etc (see Appendix B for reproducibility details). Here, we evaluate the regularized model,
after training for a number of vaues of α and τ , for CIFAR10 considering each class as the partition
P , and UTKFace with the sensitive attribute race as a partition P . Figure 6 shows example results
for the regularized models for the class “truck” in CIFAR10 and for the class “black” in UTKFace.
Results for additional classes, datasets, and models can be found in Appendix B.2.
Across the two datasets, we see that for an appropriate α and τ , we are able to reduce the robustness
disparity—i.e., difference between blue and red curves—that existed in the original model. For these
two datasets, this does not come at any cost of accuracy. We observe test set accuracy of 86.97% on
CIFAR10 without regularization and 87.82% with regularization. Similarly for UTKFace we see
accuracies of 66.25% and 65.52% for no regularization and with regularization respectively. Results
for other models and hyperparameters can be found in Appendix B.2. We interpret our experiments as
an indication that an optimization-based approach can play a part in a larger robustness bias-mitigation
strategy, rather than serving as panacea.
Broader Impact
We propose a unique definition of fairness which requires all partitions of a population to be
equally robust to minute (often adversarial) perturbations, and give experimental evidence that
this phenomenon can exist in some commonly-used models trained on real-world datasets. Using
these observations, we argue that this can result in a potentially unfair circumstance where, in the
presence of an adversary, a certain partition might be more susceptible (i.e., less secure). Thus, we call
for extra caution while deploying deep neural nets in the real world since this form of unfairness might
go unchecked when auditing for notions that are based on just the model outputs and ground truth
labels. We then show that this form of bias can be mitigated to some extent by using a regularizer that
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minimizes our proposed measure of robustness bias. However, we do not claim to “solve” unfairness;
rather, we view analytical approaches to bias detection and optimization-based approaches to bias
mitigation as potential pieces in a much larger, multidisciplinary approach to addressing these issues
in fielded systems.
Indeed, we view our work as largely observational—we observe that, on many commonly-used
models trained on many commonly-used datasets, a particular notion of bias, robustness bias, exists.
We show that some partitions of data are more susceptible to two state-of-the-art and commonly-used
adversarial attacks. This knowledge could be used for attack or to design defenses, both of which
could have potential positive or negative societal impacts depending on the parties involved and
the reasons for attacking and/or defending. We have also defined a notion of bias as well as a
corresponding notion of fairness, and by doing that we admittedly toe a morally-laden line. Still,
while we do use “fairness” as both a higher-level motivation and a lower-level quantitative tool,
we have tried to remain ethically neutral in our presentation and have eschewed making normative
judgements to the best of our ability.
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Figure 7: Depiction of σDFP and σCWP for the UTKFace dataset with partitions corresponding to the (1) class
labels C and the, (2) gender, and (3) race/ethnicity. These values are reported for all five convolutional models
both at the beginning of their training (after one epoch) and at the end. We observe that, largely, the signedness
of the functions are consistent between the five models and also across the training cycle.
Figure 8: Depiction of σDFP and σCWP for the CIFAR10 dataset with partitions corresponding to the class labels
C. These values are reported for all five convolutional models both at the beginning of their training (after one
epoch) and at the end. We observe that, largely, the signedness of the functions are consistent between the five
models and also across the training cycle.
A Model Performance
We choose popular models that are widely used by the community for classification tasks on CIFAR-
10, CIFAR-100, Adience, and UTKFace. Accuracy of these models can be found in Table 1. All
the models are pre-trained on Imagenet and then fine-tuned for the specific task. We provide
accompanying code to reproduce all of these results.
Table 1: Test data performance of all models on different datasets.
Resnet50 Alexnet VGG Densenet Squeezenet
Adience 49.75 46.04 51.41 50.80 49.49
UTKFace 69.82 68.09 69.89 69.15 70.73
CIFAR10 83.26 92.08 89.53 85.17 76.97
CIFAR100 55.81 71.31 64.39 61.05 40.36
CIFAR100super 67.27 80.7 76.06 71.22 55.16
Figures 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 show the measures of robustness bias as approximated by CarliniWagner
(σCWP ) and DeepFool (σ
DF
P ) across different partitions of all the datasets.
B Regularization Results
Using the regularization term derived in Section 5 (and in more detail in Appendix B.1) in the main
paper, we re-train models to enure that various partitions of the dataset are equally robust, or have low
robustness bias. In addition to some of the Imagenet pretrained models mentioned in Appendix A,
we also investigate this on models that are trained from scratch.
As we saw in Section 4 in the main paper, Adience barely showed any robustness bias, so in this
section we only focus on CIFAR-10 and UTKFace (partitioned by race). For CIFAR-10, we show an
in-depth analysis of two pre-trained (and then finetuned) Imagenet models: Resnet and VGG and one
Deep CNN trained from scratch, which gets an accuracy of 89% on the test set, which is comparable
to the accuracy of the Imagenet models (as shown in Table 1). The Deep CNN is a popularly-used
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Figure 9: Depiction of σDFP and σCWP for the CIFAR100 dataset with partitions corresponding to the class
labels C. These values are reported for all five convolutional models both at the beginning of their training (after
one epoch) and at the end. We observe that, largely, the signedness of the functions are consistent between the
five models and also across the training cycle.
Figure 10: Depiction of σDFP and σCWP for the CIFAR100super dataset with partitions corresponding to the
class labels C. These values are reported for all five convolutional models both at the beginning of their training
(after one epoch) and at the end. We observe that, largely, the signedness of the functions are consistent between
the five models and also across the training cycle.
Figure 11: Depiction of σDFP and σCWP for the Adience dataset with partitions corresponding to the (1) class
labels C and the and (2) gender. These values are reported for all five convolutional models both at the beginning
of their training (after one epoch) and at the end. We observe that, largely, the signedness of the functions are
consistent between the five models and also across the training cycle.
CNN for CIFAR-10, taken from the offical website of Torch.3 Similarly for UTKFace, we take a
3http://torch.ch/blog/2015/07/30/cifar.html
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publicly available CNN from Kaggle.4 We provide PyTorch implementations of all these models in
our uploaded code.
B.1 Formal Derivation of the Regularization Term
In this section, we provide a step-by-step derivation of the regularization term used in Section 5 in the
main paper. Recall the traditional Empirical Risk Minimization objective, ERM := lcls(fθ(X), Y ),
where lcls is cross entropy loss. Now we wish to model our measure of fairness (§3) and minimize
for it alongside ERM. To model our measure, we first evaluate the following cumulative distribution
functions:
Px∈D{dθ(x) > τ | x ∈ P, y = yˆ} = 1∑
x/∈P
1{y = yˆ}
∑
x/∈P
y=yˆ
1{dθ(x) > τ}
Px∈D{dθ(x) > τ | x /∈ P, y = yˆ} = 1∑
x∈P
1{y = yˆ}
∑
x∈P
y=yˆ
1{dθ(x) > τ}
This gives us the empirical estimate of the robustness bias term RB(P, τ), parameterized by partition
P and threshold τ , defined as Equation 1 below.
R˜B(P, τ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1∑
x/∈P
1{y = yˆ}
∑
x/∈P
y=yˆ
1{dθ(x) > τ} − 1∑
x∈P
1{y = yˆ}
∑
x∈P
y=yˆ
1{dθ(x) > τ}
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (1)
Now, for R˜B as defined in Equation 1 to be computed and used, for example, during training, we
must approximate a closed form expression of dθ. To formulate this, we take inspiration from the
way adversarial inputs are created using DeepFool [29]. Just like in DeepFool, we also approximate
distance from fθ considering fθ to be linear (even though it may be a highly non-linear Deep Neural
Network). Thus, we get,
dθ(x) =
∣∣∣∣ fθ(x)||∇xfθ(x)||
∣∣∣∣ . (2)
By combining Equations 1 and 2, we recover R˜B , a computable estimate of the robustness bias term
RB , as follows.
R˜B(P, τ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1∑
x/∈P
1{y = yˆ}
∑
x/∈P
y=yˆ
1{| fθ(x)||∇xfθ(x)|| | > τ} −
1∑
x∈P
1{y = yˆ}
∑
x∈P
y=yˆ
1{| fθ(x)||∇xfθ(x)|| | > τ}
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Finally, given scalar α, we minimize for the new objective function, AdvERM, as follows:
AdvERM := lcls(fθ(X), Y ) + α · R˜B(P, τ).
B.2 Additional Regularization Results
Figures 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 shows how models trained with our proposed regularization term show
lesser robustness bias. Figures 12, 13, and 14 correspond to CIFAR-10, while Figures 15, 16, and 17
4https://www.kaggle.com/sangarshanan/age-group-classification-with-cnn
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correspond to UTKFace. For example, for Deep CNN trained on CIFAR-10, for the partition “cat”,
we see that the distribution of distances become less disparate for the regularized model (Figure 12h)
as compared to the original non-regularized model (Figure 12g). This trend persists across models
and datasets. We provide a PyTorch implementation of the proposed regularization term in our
accompanying code.
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Figure 12: [Regularization] CIFAR10 - Deep CNN
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Figure 13: [Regularization] CIFAR10 - Resnet50
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Figure 14: [Regularization] CIFAR10 - VGG
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Figure 15: [Regularization] UTKFace partitioned by race - Deep CNN.
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Figure 16: [Regularization] UTKFace partitioned by race - Resnet50.
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Figure 17: [Regularization] UTKFace partitioned by race - VGG.
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